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Abstract
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency whose transactions are
recorded on a distributed, openly accessible ledger. On
the Bitcoin Blockchain, an entity’s real-world identity
is hidden behind a pseudonym, a so-called address.
Therefore, Bitcoin is widely assumed to provide a high
degree of anonymity, which is a driver for its frequent
use for illicit activities. This paper presents a novel
approach for reducing the anonymity of the Bitcoin
Blockchain by using Supervised Machine Learning to
predict the type of yet-unidentified entities. We utilised a
sample of 434 entities (with ≈ 200 million transactions),
whose identity and type had been revealed, as training
set data and built classifiers differentiating among
10 categories. Our main finding is that we can
indeed predict the type of a yet-unidentified entity.
Using the Gradient Boosting algorithm, we achieve
an accuracy of 77% and F1-score of ≈ 0.75. We
discuss our novel approach of Supervised Machine
Learning for uncovering Bitcoin Blockchain anonymity
and its potential applications to forensics and financial
compliance and its societal implications, outline study
limitations and propose future research directions.

1.

Introduction

Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency and a global distributed
payment system on which transactions are facilitated
through a peer-to-peer network. Bitcoin was first
described in 2008 [1] and ever since has attracted
the attention of the research community from diverse
academic fields [2] [3] [4] and gained mainstream
popularity due to its unique characteristics, such as the
absence of centralised control and an assumed high
degree of anonymity.

anonymity, it has been labelled as the go-to currency
for illicit activity. The shutdown of the drug market
Silk Road1 provides the most well-known example in
this context (see [5] for an analysis of Silk Road).
Moreover, there have been articles and reports [6–8]
stating that Bitcoin has been used for terror financing,
thefts, scams and ransomware. This is why financial
regulators, law enforcement, intelligence services and
companies who transact on the Bitcoin Blockchain
have become wary observers of technical developments
in, economic issues with, and the societal adoption
of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin [2–4]. For companies,
interacting with high-risk counterparties on the Bitcoin
Blockchain may yield negative consequences, either
because of legal obligations (such as anti-money
laundering procedures) or reputational risks.
For
governments, the fact that Bitcoin is used to carry out
money-laundering, terror financing or cybercrime poses
a considerable problem. In such cases, uncovering the
anonymity of the parties would be legally permissible
and ethically desirable - but technically infeasible,
according to popular belief about the robustness of the
Bitcoin Blockchain’s anonymity.
However, previous research [9] [10] has demonstrated
that it is indeed possible to cluster together Bitcoin
addresses and link such clusters to real-world identities.
These research findings go against the widely-held
belief that users’ identities are protected when using
Bitcoin. Our work builds upon and extends this area
of research, investigating the true level of Bitcoin’s
anonymity. Knowing that Bitcoin addresses can be
clustered, identified and categorised, we investigate if
it is possible to reveal (to some extent) the identity of
users or organisations on the Bitcoin Blockchain using a
Supervised Machine Learning approach.
Problem Formulation & Research Question
For this research paper, we collaborated with the
Bitcoin analysis company Chainalysis [11], which
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will be referred to as the data provider in the rest
of the paper.
The data provider has clustered,
identified and categorised a substantial number of
Bitcoin addresses manually or through a variety of
clustering techniques (sec. 4). However, the vast
majority of clusters on the Bitcoin Blockchain remain
uncategorised. Our research aims to find out if we
can predict that a yet-unidentified cluster belongs to
one of the following pre-defined categories: exchange,
gambling, hosted wallet, merchant services, mining
pool, mixing, ransomware, scam, tor market or other.
We recognise the fact that there are additional cluster
types participating in the Bitcoin economy, but the
scope of our research will be limited to said categories,
as those are the categories provided by the data
provider. At the time of writing, to the best of our
knowledge, there has not yet been any research utilising
such enriched data. Furthermore, alternative data
sources, offering more identified clusters than the data
provider’s, remain unknown. It must be noted that this
work prioritises demonstrating the feasibility of using
Supervised Learning to reduce Bitcoin Blockchain’s
anonymity over ensuring complete data reliability, as
the clustering methodology of the data provider is
proprietary and confidential. Based on the above
discussion, our research question is as follows:
To what extent can we predict the category
of a yet-unidentified cluster on the Bitcoin
Blockchain?
The outline of this paper is as follows; in sec. 2, a
brief overview of related work is provided and Sec. 3
presents the theoretical foundations. The methodology
is presented in Sec. 4 and Sec. 5 provides an overview of
the results and their substantive interpretation. Finally
Sec. 6 discusses implications of our findings, and
considers future work.

2.

Related Work

The research on Bitcoin anonymity ranges from
explaining the technological workings of Bitcoin
and Blockchains to analysing the limitations and
challenging the features of the technology, especially
its pseudo-anonymity.
Many researchers explored
the limits of the anonymity of Bitcoin by applying
heuristic approaches or statistical methods.
For
instance, clustering the Bitcoin addresses by mapping
the network, analysing the traffic and complementing it
with external pieces of information was explored in [10].
Another reserch work [12] analysed the Bitcoin system
by simulation experiments by replicating the behaviours

and transactions of the Bitcoin Blockchain.
By
using categories created from interactions with certain
services, multiple addresses belonging to the same user
were clustered together in [9], where as [13] has shown
that it is possible to identify behavioural patterns of
different types of users by creating Bitcoin Blockchain
transaction graphs and by analysing its statistical
properties. By gathering real-time transactions over a
time frame, [14] developed heuristics aiming to cluster
and reveal the ownership behind the Bitcoin addresses
and IP addresses. Finally, another work [15] developed
a graph analysis framework that uses both Bitcoin
Blockchain and data scraped from online forums and
social media platforms that belong to crypto currencies.
In the domain of Data Mining and Machine Learning,
primarily the research focus was mainly to contribute to
more effective crime investigation. Some of the notable
research include detecting suspicious transactions by
applying Unsupervised Learning techniques [16] and
building guidelines for data collection and a framework
for data processing and extraction, specifically against
fraud, false transactions and money theft [17]. Another
line of research is focused on public forums data,
constructing a network topology, and analysing a
criminal cluster such as CryptoLocker, a known family
of ransomware in the Bitcoin economy [18]. The work
in [19] focussed on applying clustering algorithms such
as multi-input heuristics for the data analysis.
Many researchers also focussed on the flaws of
the Bitcoin Blockchain and explored alternative
cryptocurrencies as well as proposals for improvements
/ new methods to bring anonymity to its users. Some
of the research works explored in-depth investigation
on Bitcoin’s technological workings, showing its
technological flaws and consequent suggestions on how
to address them [20], a protocol that enables anonymous
payments in Bitcoin and other currencies, which relies
on technology commonly used by mixing services [21].
In this regard, an important research contribution is on
building an alternative to Bitcoin named Zerocash with
zero-knowledge proofs [22] and also privacy-enhancing
overlays in Bitcoin from a theoretical perspective [23].
For the majority of the aforementioned research, the
researchers collected the Blockchain data on their own,
crafted their own categories and extracted their own
intelligence. Because the data provider supplied us with
rich data of already collected, clustered, categorised
and identified addresses, we were able to focus on the
data analysis process from the very start. In contrast
to the existing research, our analysis approach focused
on utilising Supervised Machine Learning methods to
categorise the yet-unidentified entities. To the best
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of our knowledge, there is no other research work
that focused on de-anonymising the Bitcoin Blockchain
using Supervised Machine Learning techniques.

3.

Conceptual Framework

In this section, we first present the basic concepts of the
technological workings of the Bitcoin Blockchain and
following present the clustering methodology applied to
cluster Bitcoin addresses. Finally, we will describe the
categories used to label the clusters.

3.1.

Basic Concepts

In order to transact on the Bitcoin Blockchain, a user
receives a pseudonym, an address. A user may create as
many such addresses as desired to enhance anonymity
(it is advised as best practice to create a new address
for each new transaction [24]). A transaction primarily
consists of four main elements: 1) Transaction hash
value, 2) Address of the sender, 3) Address of the
receiver and 4) Amount. The Bitcoin Blockchain
holds additional data, which will be discussed later in
this paper. Furthermore, a transaction may involve
more than one input and/or output address, making it
challenging to link multiple transactions to one person.
This manifests through, for example, the so-called
change address: Each transaction initially draws all
Bitcoin from a users account balance, then sends one
part of the amount to the desired receiver address and
the remaining part (the change) to a change address.
The change address can be same as the original sender
address, but it is a best practice to create a new change
address for each transaction. Subsequently, to approve
a transaction, the sender must use the corresponding
private key to sign a transaction. The transaction is then
sent to the network, collected into blocks along with
other transactions, after being verified, then accepted
into the Blockchain by the consensus of all peers.
Finally, the transaction is broadcasted to the network and
becomes publicly visible.
The power of the Bitcoin Blockchain lies in the fact that
each and every interaction is recorded on an immutable,
publicly accessible ledger.
This makes Bitcoin
well-suited for high-trust applications (e.g. money
transfer) that traditionally require a reliable intermediary
(e.g. clearing houses) to validate transactions. To
preserve the anonymity of Bitcoin users, their identities
are hidden behind an address, also referred to as
public key or pseudonym. This pseudonym cannot
directly be linked to the real-world identity of the

Figure 1. Anatomy of a Bitcoin Cluster

user. The problem of Bitcoin’s architecture is that once
a pseudonym gets linked to a real-world identity, it
effectively reveals all transactions undertaken by that
pseudonym, with no way of deleting the corresponding
transaction history. Such identity-revealing linking can
occur either through voluntary disclosure (e.g. when
a vendor publicises its address in order to receive
Bitcoin from its customers), or through involuntary
disclosure (like data leakages, addresses taken from
court documents or data exchange partnerships between
Bitcoin companies). Such clear-cut identification is
however seldom possible. However, there is a variety
of methods to effectively narrow down the scope of who
could own a given Bitcoin address. Like Reid et al.
(2013) [10] have found, it is possible to link the change
address of a transaction back to the initial user. Further,
it is possible to cluster together individual addresses
that are controlled by the same person using different
clustering techniques [25]. Moreover, it is even possible
to map IP addresses to Bitcoin addresses. Our approach
is to narrow down the scope of possible owners of a
cluster by predicting the category of a yet-unidentified
cluster using supervised Machine Learning approaches.
As shown in Fig. 1, an entity is defined as a person
or organisation believed to be in control of a single or
multiple addresses. A cluster is defined as a group
of addresses controlled by one entity. Corresponding
to the entity’s main activity or nature, it can be given
a category). The data provider currently assumes that
every entity can only belong to one of a category at
a time, which means that the categories are mutually
exclusive. Figure 1 shows an example of two Bitcoin
clusters (Coinbase and Customer X), where one can
observe individual Bitcoin addresses are grouped into
a cluster, pertaining to an entity. The first entity
(Coinbase) is labeled with a category label of Exchange.
An Exchange allows their customers to trade Bitcoins
for fiat currencies, whereas the other entity is labeled
Uncategorised, meaning the cluster has not yet been
identified (i. e. it has not yet been linked to a real-world
identity).
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3.2.

Clustering Methodology

The transactional data used by the data provider is
publicly available to everyone and can be retrieved from
the Bitcoin Blockchain without any cost. However, the
data used in this research has been enriched through
various data processing techniques, providing us with
addresses that have already been clustered, identified
and categorised. As defined earlier, a cluster is a
collection of Bitcoin addresses that are estimated to be
controlled by a single entity. Clusters are identified by
the data provider through different means, as follows,
• Co-spend clustering: A co-spend cluster is estimated
due to several addresses all contributing inputs to
a single transaction. Suppose, that a user sends a
Bitcoin to a merchant, with 0.4 Bitcoin coming from
one address and 0.6 Bitcoin from another. Prior
to this transaction the two sending addresses would
appear to be two separate entities. However, after the
transaction takes place we can conclude that there is
only one entity behind the transaction as both private
keys would need to be present to sign the transaction
as valid. Not only are the addresses thus linked to this
transaction, but all previous and future transactions
involving those addresses are now linked, too.
• Intelligence-based clustering: In this type of
clustering, information is gathered from outside
the Blockchain. The data sources from which
information is gathered, include but are not limited
to: data leaks, court documents, data partnerships,
exchanges that share their addresses and manual
merges due to services changing wallets.
• Behavioural clustering: As part of this clustering,
patterns in the timing or structure of transactions will
be utilised to identify a specific wallet. Basically
a wallet is nothing but a Bitcoin equivalent of a
bank account, where users store and transact their
Bitcoins. There can be a software wallet (like an
application installed by the users on their devices)
or a web / hosted wallet, which is normally hosted
and maintained securely by a third party provider.
Behavioural clustering can be used to cluster and
relate the Bitcoin addresses to known hosted services
or even to a specific wallet software.
The data provider sends at least one transaction to every
cluster before categorising it and tracks the moving
funds to ensure that the clustering is error-free. Finally,
considering that the data is used in law enforcement
and financial compliance, the clustering algorithms and
heuristics are designed and reinforced to minimise false
positives, as errors could cause serious repercussions.

Figure 2. Visualisation Network of Different
Categories

3.3.

Cluster Categories

The Bitcoin addresses that were clustered together
using above mentioned clustering techniques are further
labelled with different category labels assigned by the
data provider. These category labels can range from
non-suspicious activities such as exchanges to high-risk
categories, such as ransomware and so on. The below
are the categories used in this work for predicting an
yet-unidentified entity.
• Exchange: Entities that allow their customers to trade
fiat currencies for Bitcoins
• Hosted-Wallet: Trusted entities that offer Bitcoin
storage as a service
• Merchant Services: Entities that offer solutions to
businesses in order to facilitate the adoption of
Bitcoins as a payment method for their customers
• Mining Pool: Entities composed by distributed miners
who share their processing power over a mining
network and gain a compensation that equals to their
contribution in solving a block
• Mixing: Entities that apply techniques to reduce the
traceability of their clients’ transactions as a service
• Gambling: Entities that offer gambling services
• Scam: Entities that deceive their customers by
pretending to provide a service in order to steal their
Bitcoins
• Tor Market: Marketplaces primarily facilitating
trading of illegal goods like narcotics, stolen credit
cards, passports etc. These sites are only accessible
on the deep web through e.g. the TOR-browser
• Ransomware: Entities that are utilising the Bitcoin
Blockchain as a medium of exchange to receive
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ransom fees
• Other: Entities that have been identified but do not
belong to any of the nine categories mentioned above,
for example WikiLeaks’ donation address

the number of transactions, their mean and standard
deviation, the cluster lifetime, a cluster’s exposure to
specific other clusters, and so forth. The resulting
feature space consists of a total of 76 features.

Given the above described clustering techniques,
the consequently revealed cluster identities and their
corresponding categories, we can illustrate a network of
identified clusters.

Total number of transactions
198,097,356
Number of unique Clusters
434
Average number of transactions per cluster
456,445.52
Lowest number of transactions in a cluster
7
Highest number of transactions in a cluster
26,937,988
Table 1. Dataset Description

4.

Methodology

In this section, we will first describe the dataset and
its primary characteristics, then we will discuss the
choice between seven Supervised Machine Learning
algorithms and build a classifier in order to predict
the category of yet-unidentified clusters. We will
also discuss the need for using over-sampling to deal
with class imbalance problems of under-represented
categories and finally conclude with the dataset’s
limitations.

4.1.

Data Analysis Process

As mentioned before, the dataset used in this research
was provided by the company Chainalysis [11], which
is specialised in Bitcoin Blockchain analysis. The
dataset primarily contains transactional data, containing
details about every single transaction an entity has
participated in, such as the timestamp, the value sent
or received in Bitcoins and USD, or the counter-party
of the transaction. In addition to this, the dataset also
contains the characteristics of each cluster and in some
cases the categories have already been identified.
As shown in Table 1, the total dataset used in
this research contains approximately 200 million
transactions pertaining to 434 unique clusters. The
number of transactions per cluster varies significantly,
ranging from a low number (≤ 10) to several million
transactions. Additionally, table 2 illustrates the number
of transactions for each category. More specifically, the
average, median, minimum and maximum number of
transactions are shown, based on the observations within
the respective category. For each transaction, there are
several describing attributes, as shown in Table 3. This
information is utilised to capture the cluster’s behaviour
using time-series analysis. To describe the behaviour
of a cluster in a way that can be fed to a Supervised
Machine Learning algorithm, we extracted a set of
features from the original input variables (see Table 3)
for each identified cluster. Apart from the extracted
features, we engineered additional features such as

Category

Avg. TRX
453116
337255
1077015
568629

Median
TRX
34313
17823
112562
122627

Min.
TRX
9
62
11531
1412

Max.
TRX
26937988
13084669
8657104
3144731

Exchange
Gambling
Hosted Wallet
Merchant
Services
Mining Pool
Mixing
Other
Ransomware
Scam
Tor Market

786820
6490196
83424
2225
21277
281034

97256
122012
12074
1799
18835
17874

914
267
476
68
759
70

11941952
25716495
659181
8038
68054
3194191

Table 2. Number of transactions (TRX) per category
Feature Name
TRX Date
TRX BTC Received
TRX BTC Sent
TRX USD Value
TRX Peer Category
CP BTC Sent
CP BTC Received
CP TRX Output
Count
CP BTC Flow

Description
Timestamp of the transaction
Amount of BTC received (Blank if the entity
is the sender)
Amount of BTC sent (Blank if the entity is
the receiver)
The equivalent USD amount at the point in
time
The entity type of the counterparty (e.g.
exchange or tor-market)
The total BTC amount sent to a given cluster
The total BTC amount received from a given
cluster
The total number of transactions conducted
with the given cluster
The numerical value of received BTC minus
sent BTC with the given cluster

Table 3. List of Original Variables of the Dataset

As shown in Figure 3, the first phase in the data
analysis process is the data preparation, which contains
data preprocessing and feature extraction as the main
processing steps, in order to transform the dataset to
be readable by the Machine Learning algorithms. The
data analysis phase consists of three main steps. In the
first step, we selected and trained a set of multi-class
classifiers using their default parameters. This step
provided a preliminary evaluation of which algorithms
could be suitable for the problem at hand. In the second
step, we tuned the hyper-parameters for each model
using cross-validated random search. We assessed
the performance of each algorithm after training each
model with their respective set of optimal parameters.
Finally, in order to compensate for the class imbalance,
we used SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling
Technique [26]) to oversample the two minority classes
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Figure 3. Data Preparation and Analysis Process

hosted-wallet and mixing. After parameter tuning
with the oversampled data, each model was trained
and assessed again using Scikit-learn, [27] a machine
learning library. After assessing all the results, a
classification report and ROC curve of best performing
algorithm were produced.

4.2.

Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms

For the analysis of Bitcoin transaction data, we used
the following Supervised Machine Learning algorithms,
which are popular choices for this type of problem [28].
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

k-Nearest Neighbours,
Random Forests,
Extra Trees,
AdaBoost,
Decision Trees,
Bagging Classifier,
Gradient Boosting.

Regarding the choice of algorithms, we have excluded
linear models and Support Vector Machine, as our
dataset includes a variety of collinear variables
which may increase the variance of the coefficient
estimates, sensitivising the model to minor changes [29].
Parameter tuning was undertaken using 3-fold cross
validation due to the scarcity of known clusters (n =
434). Therefore, using a traditional train-test-validation
split would bear the risk of making the performance
too dependent on a specific subset of training data,
waste data and inhibit predictive ability [30]. As
for hyper-parameter optimisation, random search was
utilised with 1000 iterations, since it is empirically
and theoretically more effective than grid search, as it
allows the testing of a broader value spectrum for each
parameter, as well as being less likely to waste effort
on irrelevant hyper-parameters, given the same amount

of iterations [31]. A detailed description of the chosen
algorithms could be included due to space constraints.
Class Imbalance: Our dataset contains two minority
and under-represented classes hosted-wallet and mixing.
There are two reasons why certain classes are
under-sampled. First, some categories (e.g. mixing)
wish to remain unidentifiable due to the nature of their
activities and thus apply privacy-enhancing schemes.
For example, they obfuscate transactions through
so-called peeling chains: a mixing service takes a
customers’ deposits and moves it to one single address.
Then, it starts sending very small amounts from this
address to different services and the remaining coins
(the change) to a new change address; this process
is repeated until the very last coin has been spent.
This creates dozens or even hundreds change addresses,
obfuscating the actual origin of a transaction, making
it hard to identify and cluster addresses. Second, the
data provider prioritises some categories over others,
depending on their customers’ needs and cybercrime
trends, which is why classes such as hosted-wallet have
less observations. Clustering and identifying entities is
an ongoing process, hence the data provider increases
the number of categorised entities as time passes.
To deal with this class imbalance problem, we
used the SMOTE [26] method to balance out the
under-represented classes. This approach constructs
synthetic samples of the minority classes to improve the
utility of imbalanced datasets. It has been shown that by
increasing a classifier’s sensitivity to the minority class
through increasing its sample size, the prediction model
can achieve a better performance [26, 32]. The method
had been applied with a ratio of 0.075 for the two classes
with the fewest observations: mixing and hosted-wallet.
This means that synthetic samples had been generated
to the point where the minority classes reach 7.5% of
the amount of samples in the majority class. Since the
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Figure 4. ROC Curve with GBC

majority class exchange consists of 203 samples, the two
minority classes ended up having 15 samples each. As
we are using 3-fold cross validation, assessing the true
contribution of SMOTE is limited.
Dataset Limitations: Currently, the data used to train
the prediction model does not include all of the data
that is inherently available on the Bitcoin Blockchain.
This applies to the transaction fee that is associated
with the transaction priority, the amount of signatures
used to sign a transaction, the related IP address or the
transaction size and the number of confirmations, among
others. Therefore, additional features could be extracted
in order to increase the performance of our predictions.
Additionally, the amount of clusters used to train the
prediction model is limited to those that have already
been categorised by the data provider. While we do
have more than 400 categorised clusters, a larger sample
size could potentially allow to discover more categories,
as well as increase the number of examples for each of
the already-defined 10 categories, thereby improving the
performance of the model. Finally, given a larger sample
size, the methodology could be improved by utilising
a test sample, not seen by the classifier, to accurately
justify the final results of the model.

5.

Results

We split up the dataset into one with SMOTE (i.e.
adjusted for class imbalance) and one without, and
subsequently applied the data analysis process to both
datasets (Figure 3). Out of the seven algorithms,
Random Forest, Bagging and Gradient Boosting
provided the best-performing models for both with and

without oversampling. The achieved accuracies are
73% for Random Forest, 74% for Bagging and 77%
for Gradient Boosting Classifier (GBC). Performance
measures of three best classifiers are provided in Table 4
and others are skipped due to space constraints.
Algorithm
Random Forest
Bagging
Gradient Boosting
Gradient Boosting with
SMOTE

Acc.
0.73
0.74
0.77
0.78

Prec.
0.71
0.73
0.74
0.75

Recall
0.71
0.76
0.77
0.78

F1-score
0.67
0.72
0.75
0.76

Support
434
434
434
451

Table 4. Performance of the Three Best Classifiers

5.1.

Results without SMOTE

Gradient Boosting proved to be the best-performing
algorithm. The corresponding classification report
is illustrated along with the set of hyper-parameters
utilised (as shown in fig. 6 and Table 5). The low sample
size resulted in the depicted jagged lines as shown on
the ROC curve with GBC (see Figure 4). Typically,
ROC curves are smoother (similar to the micro and
macro average curves as shown on the same Figure).
It also shows that the model struggles when predicting
the categories hosted wallet and mixing, which could
be explained by the considerably lower sample size.
Table 5 shows precision, recall, F1-score and support
obtained from classification with GBC.
As for merchant services, regardless of the sample
size being larger than hosted wallet and mixing, one
could interpret that the sample size is too low and that
the observations are not differentiated enough from the
other 9 classes. Additionally, the model has difficulty

Page 3503

Figure 5. ROC Curve with GBC & SMOTE
GradientBoostingClassifier(criterion='friedman_mse',
init=None, learning_rate=0.1, loss='deviance',
,→
max_depth=13, max_features='auto',
,→
max_leaf_nodes=None, min_impurity_split=1e-07,
,→
min_samples_leaf=11, min_samples_split=2,
,→
min_weight_fraction_leaf=0.0, n_estimators=38,
,→
presort='auto', random_state=None, subsample=1.0,
,→
verbose=0, warm_start=False)
,→

GradientBoostingClassifier(criterion='friedman_mse',
init=None, learning_rate=0.1, loss='deviance',
,→
max_depth=8, max_features='sqrt', max_leaf_nodes=None,
,→
min_impurity_split=1e-07, min_samples_leaf=15,
,→
min_samples_split=2, min_weight_fraction_leaf=0.0,
,→
n_estimators=56, presort='auto', random_state=None,
,→
subsample=1.0, verbose=0, warm_start=False)
,→

Figure 7. Parameters for GBC with SMOTE
Figure 6. Parameters for Gradient Boosting Classifier
Category
Exchange
Gambling
Hosted Wallet
Merchant Services
Mining Pool
Mixing
Other
Ransomware
Scam
Tor Market
Avg / Total

Precision
0.79
0.74
0.25
0.00
0.96
0.50
0.43
0.91
0.68
0.79
0.74

Recall
0.94
0.83
0.11
0.00
0.84
0.25
0.15
0.77
0.59
0.59
0.77

F1-score
0.86
0.78
0.15
0.00
0.90
0.33
0.22
0.83
0.63
0.68
0.75

Support
201
89
9
13
31
4
20
13
22
32
434

Category
Exchange
Gambling
Hosted Wallet
Merchant Services
Mining Pool
Mixing
Other
Ransomware
Scam
Tor Market
Avg / Total

Precision
0.76
0.77
0.88
0.00
0.96
1.00
0.17
0.85
0.68
0.96
0.75

Recall
0.94
0.80
0.47
0.00
0.77
0.93
0.05
0.85
0.59
0.72
0.78

F1-score
0.84
0.78
0.61
0.00
0.86
0.97
0.08
0.85
0.63
0.82
0.76

Support
201
89
15
13
31
15
20
13
22
32
451

Table 5. Classification Report with GBC

Table 6. Classification Report with GBC & SMOTE

predicting observations from the other category, which
can be explained by the fact that the other category
encapsulates a multitude of categories. In order to
deal with class imbalance and to achieve a better
performance, SMOTE has been applied to oversample
hosted-wallet and mixing. The results can be seen in the
Figure 5.

to an accuracy of 78% as shown in Table 4.
Additionally, the corresponding classification report
showing precision, recall, F1-score and support
obtained from classification with GBC is given in the
Table 6. However, even though the overall results with
over-sampling are slightly better than the results with
the original dataset, the increase could potentially be
a product of overfitting, hence we discard the slightly
improved results generated with SMOTE. In summary,
from all the tested algorithms, Gradient Boosting
provides the best performance: The ROC-curve displays
a micro- and macro-average of respectively 0.93 and
0.83. Additionally, an accuracy of 77%, a precision of
74%, a recall of 77%, and an F1-score of 75% were
achieved as shown in classification report (Table 5).

5.2.

Results with SMOTE

Applying SMOTE to compensate for the class
imbalance improved the performance of predicting
under represented classes mixing and hosted wallet.
The overall performance of the model was increased
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6.

Discussion

In this research work, we have demonstrated a novel
method to categorise yet-unidentified clusters on the
Bitcoin Blockchain using Supervised Machine learning.
Our results show that we can predict the category of
a yet-unidentified cluster on the Bitcoin Blockchain
with a 77% accuracy (and an F1-score of 0.75) using
Gradient Boosting Classifier. Admittedly, the research
is limited by the sample size of 434 observations. As
shown previously, our model struggles when predicting
classes with low number of observations, such as
mixing and merchant services. Furthermore, accuracy
could be improved by enhanced feature engineering,
for example by using automated time-series feature
extraction. Additionally, one could consider alternative
approaches to our analysis, such as transforming the
problem into a binary classification problem and only
predicting one specific class (e.g. non-scam/scam),
reducing randomness and allowing to choose from a
broader set of algorithms. While our set of chosen
algorithms are computationally expensive, speed is not
an issue, as we don’t target real-time prediction, thus we
are outweighing the computation time of the model by
the higher performance and accuracy of the model.
The results show that it is possible to categorise
yet-unidentified clusters which means that one could
reveal the category of a significant portion of entities
on the Bitcoin Blockchain, which further challenges
popular beliefs about Bitcoin’s true anonymity. With
regard to practical applications, our approach could
potentially contribute to crime investigation, e.g. by
flagging suspicious entities such as ransomware or
scams. Finally, due to some countries’ regulations, a
company that transacts on the Bitcoin Blockchain might
be obliged to prove that the received money had not been
involved in illicit activities. For such compliance tasks,
our current research paves the way towards identifying
and detecting high-risk transactions, which could benefit
companies that wish to safeguard their reputation or to
comply with local regulations.
Our findings spark a discussion on the societal
implications of reducing Bitcoins anonymity. Privacy is
a fundamental human right, integral to the functioning
of democracy, as it limits power of the government
and private sector over the public. At face value,
our work seems to attack the privacy of Bitcoin.
However, making known such non-trivial weakspots of
Bitcoins anonymity, as found in this work, can have
positive societal implications: they make users aware
of the privacy weaknesses, enabling them to prevent
unintended identity disclosure and/or surveillance,

motivate stakeholders to improve Bitcoin’s underlying
technology to increase privacy and foster the research
on cryptocurrency anonymity.
Moreover, a more
transparent Bitcoin Blockchain could heighten the
mainstream’s trust in the cryptocurrency by enabling
law enforcement to more easily track down criminals
and thus discourage their use of Bitcoin for illicit
activity. As the EU points out in their proposed
cryptocurrency regulation: ”The credibility of virtual
currencies will not rise if they are used for criminal
purposes. In this context, anonymity will become more
a hindrance than an asset for virtual currencies taking
up and their potential benefits to spread 2 .

7.

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, a multi-class classification on Bitcoin
Blockchain clusters is conducted. The aim was to
investigate whether one can predict the category of a
yet-unidentified cluster, given a set of already identified
clusters serving as training data. The results show, that
by utilising already identified, clustered and categorised
addresses, it is possible to predict the type of a
yet-unidentified cluster with an accuracy of 77% and an
F1-score of 0.75 using the Gradient Boosting Classifier.
The outcome of the research demonstrates, that the
assumed level of anonymity of the Bitcoin Blockchain
is not as high as commonly believed and the number of
potential owners of a Bitcoin address can be narrowed
down to a certain degree. This work paves the way
for further research, where an increased amount of data
and alternative classification approaches may lead to
improved results.
In the future, we would seek to increase the relatively
low sample size of identified clusters and add
further cluster categories to create a more fine-grained
differentiation between the clusters. Also, additional
data could be utilised by harnessing more of the
inherently available data on the Bitcoin Blockchain, as
discussed in Sec. 4.2. Also, the feature engineering
process could be improved, e.g. by using automated
feature extraction. Lastly, we want to apply our
model on the whole of Bitcoin Blockchain data and
consequently present insights on the uncovered structure
of the Bitcoin Blockchain, such as category distribution
and transaction flow characteristics between those
distributions.
2 Council and Parliament of the European Union: Amendment to
directive (eu) 2015/849
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